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TO PROMOTE PROFIT IN SCIENCE AND THE
USEFUL ARTS: THE BROADCAST FLAG,
FCC JURISDICTION, AND
COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS
Robert T Numbers I1*
INTRODUCTION
Controversy surrounds the broadcast flag regulations adopted by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) in
November 2003. Broadcast flag proponents view the regulations as
"essential to protecting high-quality content distributed through un-
protected digital television broadcasts."1 Opponents, on the other
hand, believe the regulations are an "ineffective solution to a non-
existent problem" which will "impose genuine and substantial costs on
consumers and innovators" while harming the First Amendment free-
doms enjoyed by the public.2
The FCC adopted the broadcast flag regulations to address the
concerns of content providers that over-the-air digitally broadcast con-
tent would be subject to indiscriminate redistribution across the In-
ternet. While the regulations address an issue which could be a
serious problem in the future, the Commission has exceeded its juris-
diction. Additionally, the regulations disrupt the balance established
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., Wake Forest
University, 2002. I would like to thank Professors Patricia L. Bellia and A.J. Bellia for
their assistance in my Note writing process. My thanks go out to the members of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their assistance in the preparation of this Note for
publication. Most of all, my thanks go out to my wife, Caroline, and my parents,
Marley and Tom Numbers, for their love, support, friendship, and guidance.
1 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADCAST FLAG: A PUBLIC
INTEREST PRIMER 3 (Rev. 2.0 2003), available at http://www.cdt.org/copyright/
031216broadcastflag.pdf.
2 Comments of Electronic Frontier Foundation at 2, In re Digital Broad. Content
Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket No. 02-230) [hereinafter Com-
ments of Electronic Frontier Foundation].
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by copyright law between an author's monopoly and the public
interest.
This Note will discuss the FCC's jurisdiction to adopt these rules
as well as the effect the rules will have on copyright law. Part I dis-
cusses the broadcast flag's background issues, including the differ-
ences between digital and analog television and a general overview of
the broadcast flag regulations. Part II analyzes the claims put forward
by broadcast flag proponents supporting the FCC's authority to pro-
mulgate these regulations. Broadcast flag proponents believe that cer-
tain statutory provisions give the FCC jurisdiction over these issues. In
reality, these regulations are related to an entirely different area of the
digital television transition. Additionally, the Commission believes it
has ancillary jurisdiction to prescribe these rules, but in comparing
the circumstances surrounding the broadcast flag to the circum-
stances which typically allow the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, it is
clear that the broadcast flag does not satisfy these requirements. Due
to the extraordinary issues raised by these regulations, they will not be
entitled to the higher level of deference usually given by the courts to
administrative agency decisions. Finally, Part III discusses issues raised
by the broadcast flag regulations related to copyright.
Content providers have repeatedly challenged technological de-
velopments in the broadcast industry.3 The unregulated transmission
of digital music files across the Internet has made the content industry
aware of the impact unregulated transfer of digital content can have
3 The FCC involved itself in copyright during the development of cable televi-
sion systems. Jonathan Weinberg, Digital TV, Copy Control, and Public Policy, 20 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 277, 278 (2002). Broadcasters viewed this new form of
technology as "unfair competition [which] deprived them of control and compensa-
tion" for their product. Id. at 278-79. After losing in the courts, the broadcast indus-
try turned to the FCC, which promulgated rules requiring cable broadcasters to
obtain "retransmission consent" from broadcasters on a program-by-program basis.
Id. at 279. Over the next several years the FCC continued to regulate this area of
cable television because, in its view, the lack of such regulation would jeopardize "'the
continued supply of television programming... fundamental to the continued func-
tioning of broadcast and cable television alike.'" Id. at 280 (quoting 36 F.C.C.2d 143,
169 (1972)).
The advent of the video tape recorder also brought a legal challenge by the
broadcast industry. In Sony Cop. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984), Universal City Studios alleged Sony was responsible for copyright infringe-
ment because home viewers had used Sony's Betamax product to record copyrighted
television shows. Id. at 420. Universal City felt the continued, unrestricted sale of the
Betamax would have a negative effect on the value of its copyrights. Id. at 425. The
Court, through the statutory fair use analysis found in 17 U.S.C. § 107, determined
that the use of the Betamax for unauthorized time shifting, in this case, was a fair use
of copyrighted material and therefore not a copyright infringement. Id. at 454-55.
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upon their profits. These regulations are an attempt to protect the
content industry's interests by controlling emerging digital technol-
ogy. The government or private industry must eventually resolve the
issue of digital copy protection, but the legislature, not an administra-
tive agency, is the appropriate branch to address the economic, social,
and constitutional issues that arise in its consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Digital Versus Analog
1. Analog Technology
Analog television has been the primary method of broadcasting
for decades.4 To broadcast in analog, broadcasters convert a video
image into rows of pixels, coding each pixel so that once the informa-
tion is sent over the airwaves, a home television can reassemble the
pixels to display the image.
5
The quality of analog material will decrease as a user makes sub-
sequent copies.6 The content industry was able to keep control over
their copyrighted materials because the quality of these copies would
decline. 7 This method of copy protection has been obviated by the
advent of digital technology.
2. Digital Television
One of the main differences between the two systems of broad-
casting is that digital television uses a smaller sized pixel than analog
television.8 The smaller pixel size allows over four times the detail in
the image that is broadcast. 9 The digital signal is compressed so that
more information, and a higher quality image, can be sent across a
4 HowStuffWorks, Inc., How Digital Television Works: Understanding Analog TV, at
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/dtvl.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
5 Id.
6 Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age: The Law and
Technology of Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 1, 4
(2001).
7 Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv.
63, 105 (2003) ("The principal content industries-publishing, sound recording,
film, and television industries-formed, developed, and thrived around analog tech-
nology platforms in part because they inherently impeded unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution of works of authorship.").
8 PBS Online, Inc., Digital TV A Cingley Crash Course-Hip to be Square, at http://
www.pbs.org/opb/crashcourse/resolution/pixel.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
9 Id.
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smaller amount of bandwidth.' 0 Unlike an analog signal, the binary
format allows for unlimited reproduction without degradation of the
picture. 1
B. What Is the Broadcast Flag?
The broadcast flag copy protection system is comprised of both
technical standards and federal regulations. 12 There are two elements
to the recent content protection system established by the FCC. The
first is the recognition of the Advanced Television Systems Committee
(ATSC) Flag as the appropriate method for broadcasters to use if they
desire to encrypt their programs.1 3 The second portion of the system
is the requirement that "demodulators integrated within, or produced
for use in, DTV reception devices... must recognize and give effect to
the ATSC flag .... This necessarily includes PC and IT products that
are used for off-air DTV reception." 14 The regulations require any
device capable of receiving a digital television signal over the air, in-
cluding personal computers, to be able to recognize the broadcast flag
and restrict the redistribution of flagged material over the Internet.
1. ATSC Flag
The Broadcast Protection Discussion Subgroup (BPDG), a com-
mittee comprised of "more than 80 representatives from the con-
sumer electronics, information technology, motion picture, cable and
broadcast industries," created the ATSC or broadcast flag.' 5 The flag
is code embedded into a digital television signal which does not affect
the image on the screen. 16 Broadcasters can set the flag to either an
"on" or "off" position to indicate if the broadcaster wishes to restrict
the consumer's ability to redistribute the program. 17
The FCC felt the broadcast flag was the best of the available op-
tions to protect digital content.18 The FCC adopted numerous asser-
tions of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) regarding
10 PBS Online, Inc., Digital TV: A Cingley Crash Course-Bandwidth Squeeze, at
http://www.pbs.org/opb/crashcourse/digital-v analog/squeeze.html (last visited
Sept. 8, 2004).
11 Menell, supra note 7, at 109.
12 See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 1, at 3.




16 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 1, at 10.
17 Id.
18 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,556-60.
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the effects of the flag. The FCC agreed with the MPAA that "an ATSC
flag system would only limit redistribution of content and not prevent
consumer copying."'19 The FCC and MPAA felt the impact of the flag
on the price of reception devices would be minimal.2 0 Consumers will
still be able to view flag encoded programs on legacy devices (devices
built prior to the implementation of the regulations) without purchas-
ing additional equipment, 21 although the Commission acknowledged
in a footnote that the flag may make it impossible for a viewer to re-
cord a program on a flag compliant device and then view it on a non-
compliant device. 22 While the FCC focused on what it and the MPAA
viewed as the positive features of the broadcast flag, not everyone was
in agreement.
The FCC adopted this standard despite a great deal of criticism
regarding unresolved issues in the formulation of the broadcast flag.
23
Certain commentators were concerned with a perceived lack of open-
ness and transparency during the proceedings in which the broadcast
flag was adopted. 24 There were other groups which doubted the
MPAA's suggestion that there would be a low cost for transition to this
new system. 25 There were also concerns that the flag "would stifle in-
19 Id. at 23,556-57 (quoting Comments of Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc. et al. at 12, In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550
(2003) (MB Docket No. 02-230)).
20 Id. (quoting Reply Comments of Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. et
al. at 16, In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB
Docket No. 02-230)).
21 Id. (quoting Comments of Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. et al. at
27, In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket 02-
230)).
22 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
23 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,557-58.
24 Id. at 23,557. (citing Comments of Philips Electronics North America Corp. at
25-26, In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket
No. 02-230)).
The process by which the BPDG Co-Chairs' Report discussed only a single
proposal was flawed. Moreover, that proposal does not adequately accommo-
date consumer fair use expectations, and threatens both competition and
innovation.... Most meaningful negotiations occurred behind closed doors
among a small group of participants. The proponents of any particular con-
tent protection regime must not also be its judge and jury. No one subset of
industry should be left to determine whether a specific technological solu-
tion works.
Comments of Philips Electronics North America Corp. at 2526, In re Digital Broad.
Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket No. 02-230)).
25 Id. (citing Comments of Veridian Corp. at 1213, In re Digital Broad. Content
Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket No. 02-230)).
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novation."2 6 Numerous groups raised concerns that the broadcast
flag would impact fair use and other copyright issues. 27
Additionally, groups are concerned that the broadcast flag is an
inadequate tool to protect digital television because it can be circum-
vented through the use of digital to analog converters or legacy de-
vices.28 The threat posed by digital to analog converters is known as
the "analog hole." The analog hole is a process through which a tele-
vision viewer receives a digital signal and then transmits the content to
an analog recording device. 29 Although the analog medium will de-
grade over time, an individual can reconvert the first analog copy
(which will be fairly high quality) to a digital format.30 The owner of
this digital copy will be able to reproduce and redistribute the digital
copy without a decrease in picture quality. These digitized analog cop-
ies of digital television broadcasts can be freely redistributed regard-
less of the presence of the broadcast flag in the original content. The
availability of this lower quality digital content enables Internet redis-
tribution to occur more freely.31 Infringers are willing "to sacrifice
picture quality in order to reduce download times."32 Despite these
concerns, the FCC adopted the flag system.
The flag itself does not regulate the ability of consumers to redis-
tribute the materials, but simply signals devices which recognize the
flag whether or not to allow redistribution. 33 Hence, in order to im-
plement the broadcast flag, the FCC has put forward a series of regula-
tions for demodulator devices related to the broadcast flag that will go
into effect after July 2005.
"While the cost of the circuitry for processing the broadcast flag would be
small, it would not be inconsequential, and would, moreover, be borne by
users who have no need to access protected content because for content to
remain protected, the circuitry must be implemented on myriad devices
whether or not they are actually used with protected content.... These costs
will burgeon into a significant tax on all consumers and a disincentive to
purchase upgraded equipment."
Comments of Veridian Corporation at 1213, In re Digital Broad. Content Protection,
18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket No. 02-230)).
26 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,557.
27 Id. at 23,558.
28 Id. at 23,557.
29 Id. at 23,557-58.
30 Kramarsky, supra note 6, at 5.
31 See Comments of Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 2, at 5-6.
32 Id. at 6.
33 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 1, at 10.
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2. Regulation of Demodulator Devices
After the FCC's deadline, digital television demodulators must
meet several compliance requirements. First, the demodulators must
screen digital television signals for the presence of the broadcast
flag.3 4 Second, the device must "encrypt any flagged content using
'authorized technology.' '' 5 Next, the device must restrict the con-
sumer's ability to record the encrypted programs to devices which
meet certain FCC guidelines. 36 These devices must only allow redistri-
bution of encoded digital content to other devices which comply with
the FCC's regulations.
3 7
II. REBUTTING THE CASE FOR FCC JURISDICTION
The FCC's ability to proscribe the broadcast flag rules has caused
conflict on Capitol Hill. Senator Ernest F. Hollings believes the
broadcast flag regulations are clearly within the Commission's jurisdic-
tion to help implement the transition to digital television.
38 The
Chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, in contrast,
believe the Commission lacks the authority to address the intellectual
property issues raised by the broadcast flag.3 9 The FCC notes propo-
nents of the broadcast flag suggest § 336 of the Communications Act
34 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,570-71; CTR. FOR DEMOC-
RACY & TECH, supra note 1, at 11.
35 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,571; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH, supra note 1, at 11.
36 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,571; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH, supra note 1, at 11.
37 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,571; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH, supra note 1, at 11.
38 Letter from Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman of the Senate Commerce
Committee, to Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
2-3 (July 19, 2002), available at http://bpdg.blogs.eff.org/archives/hollings-powell.
pdf. The Senator finds that 47 U.S.C. § 336(b) (4)-(5), as well as the Commission's
ancillary jurisdiction, give the Commission authority to promulgate these rules. Id.
These sections are discussed infra in Parts II.A and II.B, respectively.
39 Letter from Representative James F. Sensenbrenner et al., Chairman of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, to Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Commu-
nications Commission (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/spe-
cial/FCCbdcastflag.pdf; see also Piracy Prevention and the Broadcast Flag: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) [hereinafter Piracy Prevention & the Broadcast Flag] (state-
ment of Rep. Berman, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) ("I am unaware of
any precedent for the FCC interpreting the Copyright Act as part of an FCC rulemak-
ing or in any other capacity.").
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authorizes this action.40 The Commission asserts that regulations are
appropriate under its ancillary jurisdiction to put forward regulations
which are "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [the
Commission's] various responsibilities. '4 1 When these arguments are
reviewed, it is clear that the legislative intent of the power extended to
the FCC does not allow the promulgation of the broadcast flag rules.
A. Specific Statutory Authorization
Broadcast flag proponents suggest two sections of the Telecom-
munications Act that allow the FCC to enact the flag rules. The first
supposed authorization comes from the FCC's authorization to "adopt
such technical and other requirements as may be necessary or appro-
priate to assure the quality of the signal used to provide advanced
television services. '42 Second, proponents argue the FCC's power to
"prescribe such other regulations as may be necessary for the protec-
tion of the public interest, convenience, and necessity" gives the Com-
mission the power to prescribe these regulations.4 3 Out of context,
these statutory grants seem to provide the FCC with the ability to pre-
scribe the rules. When read in context with the surrounding lan-
guage, however, they clearly do not allow the Commission to create
the broadcast flag rules.
Sections 336(b) (4) and 336(b) (5) authorize additional licenses
for the broadcast of digital television. 44 The broadcast flag regula-
40 See In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,562. The specific
section at issue is 47 U.S.C. § 336(b) (4)-(5). The FCC conspicuously declined to
address whether or not they agree with the proponents' argument on these provi-
sions, instead placing all of their justification on the ancillary jurisdiction argument.
Id. at 23,563
41 Id. (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178
(1968)).
42 47 U.S.C. § 336(b) (4) (2000).
43 Id. § 336(b) (5).
44 See id. § 336(a)-(b). The section states:
(a) Commission action
If the Commission determines to issue additional licenses for advanced tele-
vision services, the Commission-
(1) should limit the initial eligibility for such licenses to persons that, as
of the date of such issuance, are licensed to operate a television broad-
cast station or hold a permit to construct such a station (or both); and
(2) shall adopt regulations that allow the holders of such licenses to
offer such ancillary or supplementary services on designated frequen-
cies as may be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.
(b) Contents of regulations
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tions have nothing to do with authorizing additional licenses for the
broadcast of digital television. Therefore, these sections cannot be
the basis for the FCC's jurisdiction to proscribe copy protection regu-
lations. Congress has explicitly limited § 336(b) (4) to technical re-
quirements to ensure signal quality for digital television. 45 The
broadcast flag has no impact on signal quality; its implementation is
directed to copy protection. The legislative history of § 336(b) (4) and
(b) (5) indicates these sections "deal with spectrum regulation, signal
quality, and the duties of licensees. ' 46 Section 336(b) (5), which
grants broad authority to prescribe regulations, deals with enforcing
the provisions of 336(a). 47 Section 336(a) deals with eligibility for a
license to broadcast digital television and ancillary services that will be
provided by those broadcasters. 48 Providing additional licenses to the
public for digital television is in no way related to protecting the con-
tent that is broadcast by the individuals with the licenses.
In prescribing the regulations required by subsection (a) of this section, the
Commission shall-
(1) only permit such licensee or permittee to offer ancillary or supple-
mentary services if the use of a designated frequency for such services is
consistent with the technology or method designated by the Commis-
sion for the provision of advanced television services;
(2) limit the broadcasting of ancillary or supplementary services on des-
ignated frequencies so as to avoid derogation of any advanced television
services, including high definition television broadcasts, that the Com-
mission may require using such frequencies;
(3) apply to any other ancillary or supplementary service such of the
Commission's regulations as are applicable to the offering of analogous
services by any other person, except that no ancillary or supplementary
service shall have any rights to carriage under section 534 or 535 of this
title or be deemed a multichannel video programming distributor for
purposes of section 548 of this title;
(4) adopt such technical and other requirements as may be necessary or
appropriate to assure the quality of the signal used to provide advanced
television services, and may adopt regulations that stipulate the mini-
mum number of hours per day that such signal must be transmitted;
and
(5) prescribe such other regulations as may be necessary for the protec-
tion of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
Id.
45 See id. § 336(b) (4).
46 Comments of the American Library Association et al. at 19, In re Digital Broad.
Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket No. 02-230); see H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 159-61 (1996).
47 See 47 U.S.C. § 336(b) (5) (2000).
48 See id. § 336(a).
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After reviewing statutes that supposedly grant the FCC the ability
to prescribe these rules, it is clear that they are not as broad as broad-
cast flag proponents would like them to be. The regulations do not
authorize the FCC's creation of the broadcast flag. The FCC believes
that even if there is no specific statutory grant to promulgate the
broadcast flag, it has ancillary jurisdiction to prescribe the rules. 49
B. Ancillary Jurisdiction
The FCC has ancillary jurisdiction to make rules when it does not.
have an express legislative directive to do so. The FCC's ancillary ju-
risdiction was first recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.5 0 In Southwestern, the FCC promulgated rules
which restricted expansion of cable television services.5 1 The broad-
cast of Los Angeles television signals into the San Diego market was
alleged to have impacted the viewing audience of Midwest Television,
a company with a license to broadcast in San Diego. 52 Midwest as-
serted these actions would "reduce the advertising revenues of local
stations, and that the ultimate consequence would be to terminate or
to curtail the services provided in the San Diego area by local broad-
casting stations." 53 Despite having no specific statutory authority to do
so, the Commission began regulating within this area. 54 Although the
Commission could not actually predict the effect of these broadcasts,
it based its authority on substantial likelihood of a negative impact
upon current television providers.55 The Court held that in creating
the FCC, Congress had intended
"to maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on
the dynamic aspects of radio transmission,"... [and therefore] con-
ferred upon the Commission a "unified jurisdiction" and "broad au-
thority." Thus, "[u]nderlying the whole [Communications Act] is
recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the
evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement
49 See In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,563 (2003)
(rep. & order).
50 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
51 Id. at 160.
52 Id. at 160 n.4.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 165.
55 Id. (quoting Microwaved-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713-14 (1965) (first rep.
& order)).
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that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust
itself to these factors."
56
Therefore, to ensure the "orderly development of ... local televi-
sion broadcasting," the Court held the FCC had authority to prescribe
rules "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Com-
mission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting. '57 This authority allows the Commission to "issue 'such
rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions,




The Court later expanded this power in United States v. Midwest
Video Corp. (Midwest 1).59 The regulation at issue in this case was one
which mandated that "'no [cable television] system having 3,500 or
more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast sta-
tion unless the system also operates to a significant extent as a local
outlet by cablecasting and has available facilities for local production
and presentation of programs other than automated services."' 60 In a
plurality opinion, the Court held that the critical question was
whether the Commission determined its rules would "'further the
achievement of long-established regulatory goals... by increasing the
number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the
public's choice of programs and types of services.'"61
Chief Justice Burger, while agreeing in the result, was unsettled
by the FCC's regulation. In his view it "strain [ed] the outer limits of
even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction" of the Commission.
62
The Chief Justice felt the "explosive development" of cable television
required a "comprehensive re-examination of the statutory scheme."
63
In the Chief Justice's view, Congress, not the Commission and the
Courts, should take the lead in regulation to ensure that all pertinent
policy issues were considered.
64
56 Id. at 172-73 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940))
(citations omitted).
57 Id. at 177-78.
58 Id. at 178 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1968)).
59 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (plurality opinion).
60 Id. at 653-54 (plurality opinion) (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a) (1970) (re-
pealed 1974)).
61 Id. at 667-68 (plurality opinion) (quoting Microwaved-Served CATV, 2
F.C.C.2d 725, 1863 (1966) (second rep. & order)).
62 Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
63 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
64 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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While historically the FCC enjoyed broad ancillary jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court acknowledged in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.65 that
"the Commission was not delegated unrestrained authority."66 The
Court returned to the Southwestern decision and determined it was
consistent with the Communications Act because the regulations in
Southwestern were "imperative" to achieve its statutory objectives.
67
The Court emphasized the fact that Congress had previously voiced its
"disapproval" of the effects of the FCC's regulations.68 The Midwest
Video decision limits the Commission's ancillary jurisdiction to situa-
tions in which ancillary jurisdiction is necessary for the Commission to
achieve its statutory objectives or responsibilities.
In the case of the broadcast flag, the FCC asserts its regulations
are reasonably ancillary to the performance of its responsibilities
because
[t]he Communications Act charges the Commission with responsi-
bility for developing a broadcasting system that is made available on
a fair, efficient and equitable basis in communities throughout the
United States. Within the Commission's mandate for the regulation
of television broadcasting are the long established regulatory goals
of increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression
and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of ser-
vices. In addition, the Commission is charged with the responsibil-
ity of shepherding the country's broadcasting system into the digital
age . . . [making] it clear that advancing the DTV transition has
become one of the Commission's primary responsibilities under the
Communications Act at this time.
6 9
In sum, the FCC feels rulemaking regarding the broadcast flag is
reasonably ancillary to its responsibilities because without this content
protection system "content providers will be reluctant to provide qual-
ity digital programming to broadcast outlets" which, in the Commis-
sion's opinion, will cause "over the air broadcast television [to]
deteriorate" and frustrate the success of the digital television
transition.
70
In fact, Congress has charged the Commission with ensuring that
the digital television transition takes place, and this transition "is not a
market-driven migration to a new technology, but rather the unambig-
65 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
66 Id. at 706.
67 Id. at 706-07.
68 Id. at 708.
69 In reDigital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,564 (2003) (rep.
& order) (footnotes omitted).
70 Id. at 23,565.
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uous command of an Act of Congress." 7' The Commission is charged
with seeing the public through to the digital television age by ensur-
ing that all analog broadcast licenses expire on or before December
31, 2006.72 Once the licenses expire, the Commission is to reclaim
these elements of the broadcast spectrum and auction off the spec-
trum to new, non-broadcast, service carriers. 73 While the Commission
claims it needs broadcast flag regulations to shepherd the country
into the digital television era, a more accurate characterization of the
Commission's responsibilities is that Congress has charged the Com-
mission with recapturing the analog broadcast spectrum.
Courts have previously upheld the Commission's authority to re-
quire manufacturers to install components to assist this transition. In
Consumer Electronics Ass'n v. FCC, the Commission's order requiring
televisions thirteen inches or larger be equipped with tuners which
are able to receive and decode digital television signals was upheld.
74
While the Consumer Electronics Ass'n decision allows the Commission to
regulate demodulator equipment, on closer examination, there are
numerous differences between the regulations in Consumer Electronics
Ass'n and the broadcast flag that require a different result in the con-
text of the broadcast flag.
The most striking difference between the two cases is that in Con-
sumer Electronics Ass'n the court found an explicit statutory grant of
authority to regulate this type of equipment. 75 Unlike in Consumer
Electronics Ass'n, we have already seen the Commission does not have
any explicit statutory authority over digital television copy protec-
tion. 76 In fact, when it comes to the rights of copyright holders the
Constitution is clear: "[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task
of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate ac-
cess to their work product. ' 77 As a result, "as new developments have
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned
the new rules that new technology made necessary .... [T] he protec-
71 Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
72 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (14) (A) (2000).
73 47 U.S.C.S. § 3090) (14) (C) (Lexis 2002 & Supp. 2004)
74 Consumer Elecs. Ass'n, 347 F.3d at 293.
75 Id. at 297 (citing the All Channel Receiver Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (2000),
which gives the Commission the "authority to require that apparatus designed to re-
ceive television pictures broadcast simultaneously with sound be capable of ade-
quately receiving all frequencies allocated by the Commission to television
broadcasting").
76 See supra Part II.A.
77 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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don given to copyrights is wholly statutory."78 The lack of explicit con-
gressional authority for the Commission to regulate copy control casts
substantial doubt on the FCC's authority to enact the broadcast flag
regulations.
79
FCC action was necessary in Consumer Electronics Ass'n because the
inability of a large number of households to receive digital television
signals would delay the end of analog broadcast licenses.8s0 Congress
required that the FCC end all analog broadcasts by December 31,
2006,81 as long as at least eighty-five percent of the homes in every
market had "at least one television receiver capable of receiving the
digital television service signal[s].1"82 If this goal was not reached by
the specified date, the Commission would be required to extend li-
censes past the congressionally mandated date.
83
In the case of the broadcast flag, there is no similar tangible dan-
ger. There are no provisions in the statutes related to content which
require the Commission to delay the digital conversion.8 4 The FCC
contends the reluctance of broadcasters to put forward over-the-air
broadcasts of digital programming in the absence of copy controls
would cause "an erosion of our national television structure."8 5 The
result, according to the FCC, would be an inability to "foster a diverse
radio service that serves local communities throughout the country. '86
This argument, while compelling in theory, ignores the current reality
of the digital television transition.
In 2002, in the absence of any copy controls or redistribution pre-
vention, over 2000 hours of prime-time over-the-air digital television
78 Id. at 430-31.
79 In AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), the Supreme Court
seemed to indicate that while Congress can implicitly delegate authority to an admin-
istrative agency, the agencies must issue rules that contain a reasonable limitation on
their authority consistent with the purposes of the statute providing the grant. Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Ad-
ministrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1415 (2000). In this case it is likely that the
Commission's authority to promulgate rules in the area would have to conform to the
constitutional bounds of copyright laws, if not the statutory boundaries established by
Congress.
80 Consumer Elecs. Ass'n, 347 F.3d at 301 (quoting Digital Tuner Order, 17
F.C.C.R. 15,977, 15,994 (2002)).
81 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (14)(A) (2000).
82 Id. § 309(j) (14) (B) (iii) (II) (a).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,565 (2003) (rep.
& order).
86 Id. at 23,566
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were available on 490 local television stations, 87 a fifty percent in-
crease from the previous year.88 For the 2004-2005 television season,
also in the absence of any copy control or redistribution prevention
mechanisms, broadcasters produced over 2500 hours of digital televi-
sion programming.8 9 Moreover, the reach of this programming is ex-
tremely broad, with 1292 stations undertaking digital broadcasting.90
These broadcasters provide 99.69% of American households with an
over-the-air digital television signal. 91 These numbers indicate that
while broadcasters might be reluctant to introduce digital over-the-air
programming without copy protections, they are still moving forward
in a way that provides almost all Americans with an ample amount of
digital programming. The sheer number of Americans who currently
receive the signals indicates that the lack of copy controls has not
caused "an erosion of our national television structure '92 or an inabil-
87 Press Release, National Association of Broadcasters, Amount of Over-The-Air
HDTV Programming Reaches an All-Time High (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://
www.nab.org/pressrel/default.asp.
88 Id.
89 Nat'l Ass'n of Broads., HDTV Programs on the Air, at http://www.digitaltvzone.
com/hdtv-programs on-air/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2004). The major net-
works are broadcasting the following programs in high definition during the
2004-2005 television season: ABC: According to Jim, The Benefactor, Complete Savages,
Desperate Housewives, The George Lopez Show, Hope & Faith, Less Than Perfect, Life with
Bonnie, Lost, My Wife and Kids, NYPD Blue, The Practice, Rodney, 8 Simple Rules, Monday
Night Football, NBA Finals, The Stanley Cup Finals, The ABC Big Picture Show, and ABC
Saturday Night Movies; NBC: Crossing Jordan, ER Father of the Pride, Hawaii, Joey, Law and
Order, Law and Order Criminal Intent, Law and Order SVU Las Vegas, LAX, Medical Investi-
gations, Third Watch, The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, the Summer Olympics, the VISA
Triple Crown, NASCAR's Daytona 500, and made for TV movies; CBS: CSI, CSI:
Miami, CSI: NY, Clubhouse, Center of the Universe, Dr. Vegas, Everybody Loves RaymondJAG,
Joan of Arcadia, Judging Amy, The King of Queens, Listen Up, Still Standing, Two and a Half
Men, Without a Trace, NFL Playoff games, SEC College Football, AFC Divisional Play-
offs, NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament games, The Masters, the U.S. Open, and
the Young and the Restless;, FOX: Fox plans to air at least half of its prime time schedule
in 720p and Dolby Digital 5.1. Also, "FOX intends to air up to six NFL games in HD
each week in addition to all playoff games and the Super Bowl. PAX is also taking the
lead in multicasting on its digital channels, including prime time programming"; WB:
Ange Everwood, Gilmore Girls, One Tree Hill, Reba, Summerville, What I like About You. WB
also plans to air Lord of the Rings: Fellowship of Ring in HD in November, 2004. Id.
90 Nat'l Ass'n of Broads., 59 Stations Make Transition to DT, at http://www.dig-
italtvzone.com/news/newsitems/0814-04.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
91 Id.
92 In reDigital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,565 (2003) (rep.
& order).
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ity to "foster a diverse radio service that serves local communities
throughout the country."93
With ninety-nine percent of the public currently being provided
with over twenty-five hundred hours of digital television program-
ming, it is unlikely the broadcast flag would increase the number of
outlets for community self-expression or augment the public's choice
of programs and types of services by more than a nominal amount.
Additionally, the content industry has not committed to increasing
the amount of digital programming available if the broadcast flag is
adopted.9 4 The broadcast flag regulations are not necessary to achiev-
ing the Commission's statutory responsibilities. Therefore the regula-
tions fail the test established in Midwest I and should not be viewed as
reasonably ancillary.
C. The Broadcast Flag Regulations Are Not Entitled to Chevron Deference
Under the Chevron doctrine, courts typically give administrative
agency decisions a high level of deference. 95 A recent Supreme Court
decision, combined with the extraordinary nature of the FCC's regula-
tions, call into question whether the broadcast flag decision is entitled
to Chevron deference.
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,96 the Supreme Court
explained that the usual assumption that congressional silence is an
invitation for an administrative agency to "'fill in statutory gaps' . .. is
not plausible where 'extraordinary' issues about the scope of the
agency's jurisdiction are concerned. ' '9 7 While the Court set out no
particular criteria to determine when an issue goes from ordinary to
extraordinary, the determination "would turn on an effort to uncover
Congress's intent regarding the most appropriate interpreter [of legis-
lation]."98 This determination requires the court to analyze "the divi-
93 Id. at 23,586.
94 Reply Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation at 8, In re Digital
Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket No. 02-230), avail-
able at http://www.eff.org/IP/video/HDTV/20030218-reply-comments.pdf.
95 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the Supreme Court determined that "courts have a duty to defer to reasona-
ble agency interpretations not only when Congress expressly delegates interpretative
authority to an agency, but also when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a stat-
ute that an agency is charged with administering." Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001).
96 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
97 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 95, at 844 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529
U.S. at 159).
98 Id. at 913.
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sion of authority as between different agencies and different levels of
government . . . [and] a consideration of the historical evolution of
the agency's mandate and the implications to be drawn from related
post-enactment legislation."99
The authority to regulate and protect copyrighted materials is ex-
plicitly given to Congress through the Constitution's Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause. 100 Congress used its constitutionally-authorized power to
promulgate numerous statutes regarding copyright and copyright pro-
tection. 10 1 Thus, historically, authority in this area rests with Congress
and not with the FCC. The FCC's admission that it has never before
engaged in these types of regulatory activities weighs against classify-
ing this decision as an "ordinary" issue of jurisdiction.
10 2
The existence of an implicit grant of authority from Congress to
enact the broadcast flag is further called into question because a bill
proposing this type of legislation was considered in the Senate. Sena-
tor Ernest F. Hollings proposed the Consumer Broadband and Digital
Television Promotion Act,10 3 which would have required all digital
media devices sold in the United States to contain copy protection
equipment specified by the Commission.10 4 Congress never acted on
the bill either in Committee or on the Senate floor. If an implicit
grant of authority clearly existed, it would be unlikely that the FCC
would need this explicit grant of authority. All of these factors indi-
cate that the promulgation of the broadcast flag rules constitute an
extraordinary issue concerning the FCC's jurisdiction and therefore
the Commission's rule should not be entitled to Chevron deference,
and instead be reviewed de novo. 10 5 As discussed above, the Commis-
sion's arguments regarding its jurisdiction do not stand up to scrutiny
and therefore the regulations should be invalidated.
Administrative agency decisions raising constitutional questions
are also on questionable ground regarding Chevron deference. 106 The
canon of avoidance of constitutional questions "says that when faced
with a choice between two interpretations of a statute, one that does
not raise a serious constitutional question and one that does, the
99 Id.
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
101 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
102 See In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,566 (2003)
(rep. & order).
103 S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002).
104 Declan McCullagh, Anti-Copy Bill Hits D.C., WIRED NEWS, Mar. 22, 2002, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51245,00.html?tw=wn-story-related.
105 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 95, at 836.
106 Id. at 914-15.
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court should [choose] the interpretation that does not raise any seri-
ous constitutional question[s].' ' 7 At times, the Supreme Court has
indicated this canon of construction trumps the Chevron doctrine. 08
The broadcast flag regulations raise serious First Amendment ques-
tions because of the impact of the regulations on copyright law. 10 9
Therefore, because of the constitutional questions raised by the regu-
lations, any statutory interpretation which may give the Commission
authority should be interpreted as not providing the Commission with
this jurisdiction.
III. COPYRIGHT CONCERNS
I am not convinced that we have adhered to our well-meaning
pronouncements. 10
Although the Commission asserts "the scope of [the broadcast
flag] decision does not reach existing copyright law," it clearly does. " I1
In their comments on the order, a number of Commissioners voiced
their concerns about the ruling's possible effect on copyright is-
sues. 112 The copy controls resulting from the Commission's regula-
tions impact the core of modern copyright law and the constitutional
issues surrounding it. The copyright concerns raised by the broadcast
flag fall into two broad categories: first, the broadcast flag's impact on
the public domain and, second, the broadcast flag's effect on fair use.
A. Restrictions on the Public Domain
The creator of an individual work will determine whether the
broadcast flag will be used to protect his or her work. The work's
creator is thus able to restrict the public's use of the work regardless
of whether it qualifies for copyright protection.
107 Id. at 914.
108 Id. (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001); EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988)).
109 See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
110 In reDigital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,620 (2003) (rep.
& order) (Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, approving in part and dissenting in
part).
111 Id. at 23,555.
112 See id. at 23,616-17 (Commissioner Michael J. Copps, approving in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the commission had not precluded the use of the flag
for non-copyrightable material); id. at 23,620 (Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein,
approving in part and dissenting in part) ("I am not convinced that we have adhered
to our well-meaning pronouncements [that this decision will have no effect on copy-
right law].").
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While copyright protection has expanded recently, there are still
certain limitations on what qualifies for copyright protection. At the
very minimum, for a work to qualify for the exclusive rights arising
under the copyright clause, it must possess some sort of originality.
11 3
The courts have not announced specific guidelines for what actually
qualifies as an original work and "the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low.""I 4 Despite the low standard, the Supreme Court has
concluded there will be some works that will not meet this constitu-
tionally-mandated standard. 115 The practical effect of the broadcast
flag regulations is that broadcasters can choose to protect works that
do not meet the originality standard, and therefore should be in the
public domain. This effectively eliminates the originality requirement
of copyright law in the context of digital television.
The broadcast flag also challenges another constitutionally-man-
dated element of copyright: the limited times doctrine. In accord
with the constitutional power to proscribe copyright limitations on
works for "limited times," 116 Congress has established the duration of
an author's copyright. 1 7 The Supreme Court has held that a time
prescription qualifies as a "limited time" so long as it is "'confine[d]
within certain bounds,' 'restrain [ed],' or 'circumscribe [d].' "118 The
broadcast flag regulations make no mention as to how long the flag
will apply to any particular work or how the demodulators will deter-
mine if a work's copyright has expired. Therefore the limit on the
public's use and dissemination of a work is subject to no boundary, or
at best, to the goodwill of the content provider to deactivate the
broadcast flag. Neither of these scenarios would seem to qualify
under the Eldred definition of "limited times." By failing to address
these issues, the Commission effectively issued a perpetual copyright
restricting many of the rights the public should enjoy after a copyright
expires.
These standards also significantly challenge the idea/expression
dichotomy at the core of copyright legislation. This dichotomy, em-
113 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
114 Id. at 345.
115 Id. at 358 ("We conclude that the statute envisions that there will be some fact-
based works in which the selection, coordination, and arrangement are not suffi-
ciently original to trigger copyright protection.").
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
117 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
118 Elidred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (quoting SAMUEL JOHNSON, A Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. Rivington 7th ed. 1785)).
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bodied in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), 119 "'strike[s] a definitional balance be-
tween the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expres-
sion." 20 The broadcast flag protects every element of a work, both
the ideas and the method of expression. This is especially disturbing
in light of the fact that the Commission did not exempt news pro-
gramming from the auspices of broadcast flag regulation.12 1 Under
the broadcast flag regime, everything from local government meetings
to images of important national events will be restricted in their use by
the public.122 Images such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the protests
in Tiananmen Square, and the September 11 attacks might not be
available for public use, except in those ways which the content pro-
vider and those designing flag-compliant technology allow them to be
used. Inherent economic value of broadcasts should not strip the in-
herent constitutional rights of the public to make fair use of these
programs.
B. Fair Use Implications
With today's technology, [the broadcast flag] would prevent the stu-
dent from e-mailing [a school project containing marked content]
because a secure system does not yet exist for e-mailing. But as soon
as that technology is developed, and I believe it will be, then that
would be made possible as well.... This is a technological issue, not
a policy issue.
123
While copyright holders exercise a monopoly on certain exclusive
rights, these rights are subject to the limits of the fair use doctrine. 24
The public can use copyrighted works "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
119 "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex-
tend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, princi-
ple, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
120 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir.
1983)).
121 In reDigital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,558 (2003) (rep.
& order).
122 See id. at 23,616-17 (Commissioner Michael J. Copps, approving in part and
dissenting in part).
123 Piracy Prevention & the Broadcast Hlag, supra note 39, at 58, 66 (testimony of Fritz
Attaway, Attorney for MPAA), available at http://www.cdt.org/copyright/
20040213flagcomments.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
124 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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classroom use), scholarship, or research" without infringing on the
author's copyright. 125 Congress codified the common law doctrine
and laid out a four-part, fact-specific test to determine what qualifies
as a fair use.'
26
The broadcast flag takes this determination away from both con-
sumers and the courts. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios
127
established one of the most common methods of fair use. Time shift-
ing consists of recording a program at one time and watching it at a
later time.128 The broadcast flag would restrict the ability of consum-
ers to make full use of these recordings. The Commission stated that
"currently, content recorded onto a DVD with a flag-compliant device
will only be able to be viewed on other flag-compliant devices and not
on legacy DVD players."'129 Instead of fair use being determined by
courts, it will be determined by the quantity and quality of technology
a consumer owns and, as Mr. Attaway, the attorney for the MPAA,
noted above, the development of technology. The Commission called
this a "single, narrow example" and felt that the incompatibility of
legacy and flag-compliant devices "is outweighed by the overall bene-
fits gained in terms of consumer access to high value content."'
30
This contrasts with the Supreme Court's decree that determinations
of fair use should not be reduced simply to technical rules.'1
3
This mandate will also freeze out fair uses yet to be developed.
"If, for example, the federal government had in 1972 imposed a man-
date on devices capable of recording analog television, and had judi-
ciously followed the borders of fair use precedents of the day, such a
mandate would almost certainly have prohibited . . . the first con-
sumer VCR."'132 The next VCR, Internet, or e-mail cannot be contem-
plated by the Committee and these regulations could delay or defeat
such innovations.
125 Id.
126 Id. The four factors are: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of
the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyright. Id.
127 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
128 Id. at 423.
129 In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,559 n.47 (2003)
(rep. & order).
130 Id.
131 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) ("The task is not
to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for case-by-case analysis.").
132 Comments of Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 2, at 14.
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Additionally, the broadcast flag will significantly frustrate the ex-
emption in copyright law for libraries. Congress has provided librar-
ies with specific exemption from copyright law in order to compile an
archive of the cultural record. 133 These archives are used "to research
changes in public opinion, dress, and social trends, and by the broad-
casters themselves to do research for news stories."'31 4 Often, the re-
cordings are used away from the library where they are stored. 13 5 Any
recordings of broadcasts made on flag-compliant devices would be in-
accessible to library patrons using legacy devices. 13 6 This is especially
disconcerting because "[1] ibraries are a primary source of information
for under-served populations such as remote rural communities, re-
cent immigrants, the poor, and the homeless."'1 37 Fair use and re-
search abilities should not be limited simply to those who have the
means to afford the newest technology. While the Commission is
right in that its rules will not affect the ability of a defendant to make a
fair use defense, 38 the effect of these regulations is to defeat the abil-
ity of ordinary consumers to make fair use of a copyrighted work in
the first place.
The public's inability to make any fair use of copyrighted works
raises severe First Amendment concerns. The Supreme Court has said
the fair use exceptions are essential to a constitutionally-acceptable
balance between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. 3 9
Under a broadcast flag regime, the fair use safety valve under previous
copyright law will be turned off until technology can determine a "se-
cure" method to transfer encrypted information. Once the appropri-
ate technology has been created, the public can only make use of the
information if it can obtain and use this technology. It is antithetical
to the values of the First Amendment to restrict the realm of those
who can fully express themselves to that segment of the population
that can afford the newest technology.
The broadcast flag regulations will have an adverse impact on the
ability of the public to make fair use of copyrighted materials. Under
133 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).
134 Comments of Association of Research Libraries at 16, In re Digital Broad. Con-
tent Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003) (MB Docket No. 02-230), available at http:/
/www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/brflagcomment.pdf.
135 Id. at 16-17.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1.
138 See In re Digital Broad. Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,555 (2003)
(rep. & order) ("[T]his decision is not intended to alter the defenses and penalties
applicable in cases of copyright infringement, circumvention, or other applicable
laws.").
139 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
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the broadcast flag regime, a bureaucracy will determine, in advance,
what constitutes fair use. The flag will limit the public's ability to
watch a pre-recorded program on more than one device, stifle innova-
tion, and limit the public's access to information from public libraries.
Despite the FCC's "well-meaning pronouncements,"'
40 the broadcast
flag is most definitely an important policy issue and not a technologi-
cal issue.
C. Broader Copyright Implications
The broadcast flag regulations are a continuation of a larger de-
bate regarding the best legal methods to control copyrights in the dig-
ital age. Those supporting the broadcast flag regulations believe that
"the most efficient legal regime . . . is that which permits copyright
owners to maximize control over the terms and conditions of use of
their digital property."14 1 Those who own the copyrights of digital
works believe this new regime is necessary because of the ease with
which unauthorized copies of their work can be redistributed.
142 The
content owners argue unauthorized redistribution reduces both their
control over their property and their incentive to produce further
works. 14 3 The content producers assert that without the broadcast
flag their only option is to refuse to broadcast digital television pro-
grams in the absence of this encryption technology.
144 The broadcast
flag gives copyright owners the ability to unilaterally determine the
level of access consumers are granted to their content beyond the
rights established by copyright law.
14 5
The broadcast flag is an attempt by the content industry to com-
modify every conceivable use of its digital product. The end result of
the commodification is to create a market for these uses where con-
sumers will have to gain an express or implied license to use digital
works in ways they were previously allowed to use without any con-
sent.146 The broadcast flag regulations accomplish this goal by pro-
tecting copyrighted material previously exempted from copyright
protection. 147 Additionally, once consumers purchase one flag com-
140 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
141 Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 464 (1998).
142 Id. at 473.
143 Id.
144 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 87-91 and accom-
panying text.
145 Cohen, supra note 141, at 470-72; see supra Parts III.A, III.B.
146 Cohen, supra note 141, at 511-12.
147 See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
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pliant device, they will most likely have to upgrade all of their digital
devices to ensure compatibility throughout their homes. 148
Content providers create these protection methods because of
the expense of enforcing their rights and the inability to adequately
monitor the use of their works.1 49 Digital rights management technol-
ogy like the broadcast flag solves these problems by "replac[ing] the
uncertain terrain delineated by fair use and other statutory exemp-
tions with a menu of neatly defined, individually priced usage rights
from which consumers may choose."150 The ordinary consumer, in
effect, will have no choice but to use digital content the way that the
content provider dictates.151
The argument that the market will simply choose the product
that best balances the interests of the copyright owner and the public
domain is flawed. Consumers must overcome serious collective action
problems in order to have an effect on the marketplace. 152 Because
of the uneven market power between copyright owners and the pub-
lic, the owners can force into the marketplace products that protect
their interests at the expense of the public.1 53 Additionally, once
products with the technology preferred by the content industry have
been broadly introduced into the market, it may be difficult for con-
sumers to "vote with their feet" for a change in the technology be-
cause there may be no adequate substitute products.1 54 In this way,
the broadcast flag regulations strengthen the rights held by current
copyright owners at the expense of the public and future authors. 155
CONCLUSION
The FCC has attempted to resolve the important issue of the un-
authorized redistribution of digital television programming through
the adoption of the broadcast flag regulations. Despite its well-mean-
ing intentions, the Commission has gone beyond its jurisdiction and
invaded the area of copyright law. The statutory provisions broadcast
flag proponents assert give the Commission jurisdiction are related to
signal clarity and do not give the commission the authority to promul-
gate these rules. 156 Nor does the FCC have ancillary jurisdiction to
148 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
149 See Cohen, supra note 141, at 519.
150 Id. at 532.
151 Id. at 529.
152 Id. at 536.
153 See id. at 533.
154 Id. at 530.
155 Id. at 558.
156 See supra Part II.A.
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adopt these rules. The courts have held that ancillary jurisdiction is
appropriate where the regulations are necessary to fulfill the Commis-
sion's responsibilities. 57 The broadcast flag regulations are not nec-
essary to ensure that the transition to digital television broadcasts is
completed by the January 1, 2007, deadline.
158
The regulations will also conflict with a number of established
copyright principles. They will let content providers avoid the origi-
nality requirement of copyright law as well as challenge the limited
times doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy.1 59 Fair use will
also fall victim to the broadcast flag regulations because the border of
fair use will be determined by the content industry and the type of
technology the consumer owns.
1 60
The broadcast flag is one element in the larger debate over the
commodification or propertization of copyright. The voice of the
public has not been heard in both the broadcast flag debate and other
digital rights management debates. Moreover, rights which the public
has previously enjoyed are being eliminated for the economic benefit
of the content industry. In essence, these digital rights management
technologies are modifying copyright law so that its main focus is no
longer "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts,"
1 6 1
but instead to promote the profit of science and useful arts.
Much like the situation facing Chief Justice Burger in Midwest
Video, the explosive development of digital television and the ease with
which users can redistribute digital content requires a comprehensive
reevaluation of the copyright laws. This reevaluation is a complicated
balancing act between the needs of the content industry and the inter-
ests of the public. For this reason, Congress, and not administrative
agencies, should take the lead in determining the most appropriate
manner to address these issues.
157 See supra Part II.B.
158 See supra Part II.B.
159 See supra Part III.A.
160 See supra Part III.B.
161 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
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